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Abstract 
We present a framework of group cooperation and competition in which agents are concerned not only about their material 
payoffs but also about their psychological payoffs, derived from working with others per se. In such a framework, a group‟s 
psychological preferences serve to enhance the group‟s material payoffs. We show that a small group has strong incentives to 
engage in outward-looking identity strengthening, such as stereotyping or airing grievances against a specific, large outgroup, 
and a large group has strong incentives to engage in inward-looking identity strengthening, such as self-stereotyping, glorifying 
its own history, etc.. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Intergroup relationship has been a core area in social psychology and a vast literature has evolved to address 
questions pertinent to it. Specifically, a question frequently raised is: To what extent defining a group predicates on 
defining other groups. According to Brewer & Miller (1996): 
 
“Discussion of the importance of meaningful intergroup differentiation as a determinant of social 
identification raises the issue of the social context within which ingroups are defined... „[w]e are 
what we are because they are not what we are...‟ But who constitutes this ambiguous „they‟? Are 
relevant others limited to members of specific contrasting groups, or could „they‟ refer to all other 
human beings who are excluded from membership in the ingroup?... Both theory and research are 
ambiguous on this issue of the need for specific outgroups as a factor in ingroup identity.” (pp. 47-
48) 
 
In this paper we present a group-theoretic model to shed light on this question. Imagine a community populated 
by agents with different characteristics (both economic and non-economic). They are partitioned into exhaustive and 
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mutually exclusive groups so that those in the same group share the same characteristics (including preferences). 
Entry into and exit out of a group is forbidden so that no asymmetry between different dimensions of identity (class, 
race, religion, etc.) is presupposed. Agents interact among themselves to generate material production, obtaining 
material payoffs; they also derive (positive or negative) utility from the interactions per se, obtaining what we call 
psychological payoffs. Because agents in the same group are of the same characteristics, they may, for instance, 
enjoy greater psychological payoffs when working with each other than with any outgroup member. We use the 
term group identity1 to describe the psychological preferences shared in a group. 
 
The key ingredient of the model is that material payoffs and psychological payoffs are substitutes. Whereas the 
concern about the former compels agents to work together, the concern about the latter strengthens their bargaining 
power in their share of output. Hence, psychological preferences play a subtle role in affecting a group‟s material 
payoffs.2 In this paper, we study a group‟s incentive to strengthen its own identity, through means such as education, 
propaganda, etc.. Two strategies are compared ---- one that increases the group‟s amicability among members and 
the other that decreases its amicability towards some judiciously chosen out-group. The former is meant to be one 
that does not require specific knowledge about outgroup members, while the second is meant to be one that requires 
such knowledge of a specific outgroup. We find that a large group benefits more from the former and a small group 
more from the latter. This thus sheds light on the question to what extent defining a group predicates on defining 
other groups. 
 
A companion paper (Chiu & Zhong, 2011) further clarifies the material foundation to the psychological 
preferences introduced in this framework. It also applies the framework to study two contemporary phenomena of 
interest to social psychologists. The first is the declining importance of class in contemporary politics in developed 
economies. A widely accepted explanation is that class conflict is greatly attenuated because voters are concerned 
also about non-economic issues like religion, race, abortion, etc.. What remains to be explained is how the multi-
dimensionality of preferences is determined, and to what extent it is “manufactured” by the rich. The second 
phenomenon is the salience of racial/ethnic conflict over class conflict in third-world countries. The pork theory, as 
proposed by Fearon (1999) and Caselli & Coleman II (2010), starts with the observation that unlike other social 
dimensions race is the easiest to be recognized while the hardest to be changed. Thus race-based coalitions provide 
the strongest warranty for agents to share the “pork” ex post and hence the strongest incentive for them to grip it ex 
ante. Chiu & Zhong (2011) generate interesting implications consistent with these two phenomena without using the 
existing economic theories.  
2. Model 
Our model follows the model in Chiu & Zhong (2011) closely. Consider a community consisting of a set of 
agents of measure N  partitioned into n  exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups; without confusion, we use 
n,,1  to denote these groups. We use nss ,,1  to denote the measure of membership in each group. We assume 
that members in the same group have already overcome their collection action problem. As a result, we can adopt 
the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 1: Each group acts as a single decision maker. 
 
Agents produce output according to a characteristic function  v : the value of the output produced by group i  
when it works alone is  iv , the value of output produced jointly by group i  and group j  is  jiv  , etc.. The 
characteristic function satisfies the following standard property (see, for instance, Shapley, 1953). 
 
 
1 It can be alternatively called group solidarity or group loyalty. 
2 Other major theories in intergroup bias also have the feature that an agent's psychology is useful for or enhances the agent's survival. Hewstone 
et al. (2002) succinctly summarize the following five major theories: social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 
1991), subjective uncertainty reduction (Hogg, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1993), terror management (Solomon et al., 1991), and social dominance 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
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Assumption 2: The characteristic function  v  is strictly superadditive, i.e.,      2121 RvRvRRv  , where 
1R  and 2R  are any two disjoint collections of groups. 
 
Strict superadditivity corresponds to the scenario where agents are strictly complementary in production and, as a 
result, formation of and cooperation in the grand coalition is socially optimal. In addition to material products, 
agents are also concerned about with whom they work; more specifically, agents derive psychological utility from 
working together per se. An interesting special case is homophily, i.e., agents prefer working with other agents in 
the same group. In the context of ethnicity, for instance, an individual may feel more comfortable dealing with a 
member of her ethnic group than with a non-member; in the context of religion, an individual may feel more 
comfortable dealing with someone who shares the same religious belief than someone who does not. 
 
More generally, we represent group i ‟s psychological preferences by a vector  inii aa ,,1 a  of coefficients 
characterizing the group‟s intragroup and intergroup amicability. Put differently, ija  measures how much group i  
members want to work with group j  members. By forming a coalition R  with some other groups, group i  will 
obtain psychological payoffs 
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where jRjR ss   . 
 
The right-hand side (RHS) of (1) has a natural interpretation. Within a certain period of time, members in the 
coalition engage in pairwise matching so that each member spends an equal amount of time with every other 
member. For a member in group i , in particular, she will spend Ri ss /  of her time with group i ‟s members, and 
Rj ss /  of her time with group j ‟s members, where iRj \ . This accounts for the term in the parentheses on 
the RHS of (1). Given is  members in group i , the RHS represents the total psychological payoffs that group i  
members will collectively obtain when coalition R  is formed. If iR  , i.e., if group i  chooses to work alone, its 
psychological payoffs will simply be   iiii asi  . 
 
The way we model the utility function follows that of Alesina & La Ferrara (2000), who study residents‟ 
decisions to contribute to a public good in a racially heterogenous community. In their model, each resident‟s utility 
is assumed to depend on the proportion of residents of the same race as himself or herself in the whole population. 
Using US survey data on attitude toward redistribution, Luttmer (2001) finds that, controlling for income, 
individuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group 
rises. Luttmer refers to this as group loyalty. We think that assuming some kind of psychological payoffs when race 
is concerned is a good short-cut in the modeling. 
 
We call the n -vector ia  as group i ‟s identity and the components of the vector as the group‟s identity 
coefficients or amicability coefficients. Given   inii aa ,,1' a  and    inii aa ,,1 a  if   iiii aa  and   ijij aa  
for any ij  , we say that group i  has a stronger identity under ia  than under 

ia , or 

ia  is an (identity) 
strengthening of ia . (Note that  iniiii aaa ,,,,1 a  with ijaa ijii  ,  corresponds to the 
aforementioned phenomenon of homophily.) Each group‟s identity coefficients are exogenously given, and our main 
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exercise is to perform comparative statics of group welfare with respect to these coefficients.3 
 
Next, we assume that a group‟s total payoffs equal the sum of its material payoffs and psychological payoffs. 
Thus, given a coalition R , the total utility of its member groups is given by 
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We call  u  the total characteristic function. 
 
Assumption 3: The total characteristic function )(u  is strictly superadditive, i.e.,      2121 RuRuRRu  , 
where 1R  and 2R  are any two disjoint unions of groups. 
 
Assumption 3 states that, because the absolute values of lma  are moderate enough for all l  and m , even when 
psychological payoffs are also taken into account, the formation of the grand coalition is still efficient. It is worth 
noticing that most research in social psychology about intergroup bias focuses on milder degree of bias (see the 
survey by Hewstone et al., 2002). 
 
Given the total utility function, we assume that each group obtains its own Shapley value taking each group as an 
individual player.4 Assumption 1 justifies the treatment that each group enters the bargaining as a single decision 
maker. Assumption 3 implies that forming the grand coalition is indeed efficient. 
 
More specifically, group i  will obtain a total payoff of 
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where T  is the number of groups in coalition T . There is a natural interpretation here. Imagine that groups arrive 
at the scene in a random order, then (2) is just group i ‟s weighted average of its marginal contribution to each 
conceivable coalition that it joins. 
 
We use  Ni  to denote group i ‟s material payoffs, where 
 
      .NNN iii    
 
When our discussion is restricted to a smaller union of groups, NR  , the total payoffs and material payoffs that 
group i  obtains are denoted by  Ri  and  Ri , respectively, and are calculated in a similar manner. To 
economize the notation, we define  Nii   ,  Nii   , and  Nii   . 
 
In what follows, we are interested in the effect of identity coefficients on the material payoff of groups. To this 
end, we study how an infinitesimal change in the former influences the latter. The change may be made possible by 
 
3 Despite similarity, the notion of group identity we use is different from the notion of identity as is well known in the literature. The latter is 
formally introduced to economics in the seminal paper by Akerlof & Kranton (2000) and there, defined from an agent's perspective, identity 
means the agent's sense of self. 
4 For Shapley value and its noncooperative game theory foundation, see Dasgupta & Chiu (1998). 
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education, media, subtle priming, etc..5 One can of course go further to take into account the costs incurred to 
change identity coefficients. If we consider a sufficiently convex cost function, there will then be a small extent to 
which identity is optimally changed. 
3. Results 
3.1. A material foundation of psychology 
In Chiu & Zhong (2011), we find that a group‟s material payoff (i) is increasing in its intragroup amicability, as 
well as the intergroup amicability towards it; (ii) is decreasing in the intragroup amicability within and intergroup 
amicability among other groups; and (iii) somewhat surprisingly, may be increasing in its amicability toward some 
outgroup. The basic idea is that, by working with outgroup members, group members will be diluting their own 
interactions ---- as well as the interactions of outgroup members ---- and their bargaining power will be strengthened 
or weakened dependent on the various group identities. While results (i) and (ii) are fairly intuitive, result (iii) 
suggests intriguing counter-intuitive spillovers between groups and is worth restating formally here (proof omitted). 
 
Lemma 1: For ij   and 0is  and ,0js  
1.  0/  iji a  )0(  if     212/  nnji Nss  )( 1221  nn ; and 
2. for ,3n  0/  iji a  if and only if   4/1/  Nss ji . 
 
Presupposition has it that loving others always hurts as long as material payoff is concerned. Lemma 1 says that 
this presupposition is not true if the combined size of the ingroup and the outgroup being loved is sufficiently small. 
3.2. Identity strengthening 
The material foundation of identity discussed in the previous section suggests that an individual group does have 
the incentive to modify and in most cases strengthen its identity. Consider the following two ways of identity 
strengthening (through media, education, etc.) 
 
 Group i  is said to engage in stereotyping (or outward identity strengthening) if it chooses to decrease its 
amicability (or increase its hostility) toward one particular out-group j , i.e., to decrease ija  for one ij  . 
 Group i  is said to engage in self-stereotyping (or inward identity strengthening) if it chooses to increase its 
intragroup amicability, i.e., to increase iia . 
 
The self-stereotyping strategy is built by nurturing the belief among the ingroup members that their group is 
unique and special, without referring to specific features of any outgroup. The stereotyping strategy goes exactly the 
other way. It is the very peculiar feature of group j  that makes members in group i  think they themselves are 
different. Throughout the whole reasoning, the focus is outgroup j  but not ingroup i . We now compare the 
profitability of these two alternative strategies, by examining one-unit changes in the respective identity coefficients. 
 
The material benefit of the self-stereotyping strategy is iii a /  while the material benefit of the stereotyping 
strategy targeting group j  is iji a / . Hence, as far as material payoff is concerned, the stereotyping strategy 
 
5 A large literature in social psychology has grown to establish the social cognitive perspective in intergroup bias. Much of the research shows 
that, under most minimal conditions, respondents show ingroup preferences. “These findings appear to suggest that a history of intense dislike 
and conflict is not necessary to produce ethnocentric behavior. The mere division into groups suffices.” (Park & Judd, 2005, pp. 109) For a 
critique of this view, see Park & Judd (2005); for recent evidence, see Gutierrez & Unzueta (2010), Morrison & Chung (2011), and Woltin et al. 
(2011). 
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is more profitable if 
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where the max  operator implies that the targeted outgroup is judiciously chosen. It is straightforward to obtain the 
following lemma (see Appendix for proofs to the lemma and the next proposition). 
 
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions 1-3, we have 
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Lemma 2 means that, in terms of group i ‟s material payoffs, increasing iia  by one unit while holding ija  
constant for all ij   is the same as decreasing ija  by one unit for all ij   while holding iia  constant. 
Comparing (3) with (4), one can easily verify that (3) holds only if there exists some ik   such that iki a /  is 
positive. Put differently, a necessary condition for the outward strategy to be the optimal strategy for group i  is that 
there exists some group k , ik  , such that group i  can benefit from increasing its amicability towards it. The 
condition for this latter scenario was given in Lemma 1. Making use of it, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1-3, we have 
 
1. for 4n ,  ijijiii aa  /max/   if (i) 1221/  nni Ns  or (ii) js  is the same for all ij  ; 
2. for 3n , iiiiji aa  //   if   )/1(/2/ NsnNs ij  ; 
3. for 3n , iiiiji aa  //   if    21
1/

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j Ns ; 
4. for 3n , iiiiji aa  //   if and only if .4/3/ Nsj   
 
Result 1.i states that, assuming 4n , the self-stereotyping strategy dominates when group i ‟s size is large 
enough (e.g. exceeding one third when 4n  ) because the intragroup amicability now has an overwhelming 
weight in determining psychological payoffs. The same is true when all outgroups are symmetric in size so that no 
particular outgroup is important enough to be targeted towards (result 1.ii). Results 2 and 3, respectively, provide 
sufficient and necessary conditions, when 3n , for the stereotyping strategy with targeted group j  to dominate 
and to be dominated by the self-stereotyping strategy, respectively. When outgroup j  is sufficiently small, the 
stereotyping strategy with j  as the targeted group is dominated by the self-stereotyping strategy; when it is 
sufficiently large, the reverse is true. Result 4 gives the necessary and sufficient condition for the outward strategy to 
dominate the self-stereotyping strategy when there are only three groups i , j , and k . Because 3n , there are 
only two terms in the RHS of (4), and the necessary condition is also the sufficient condition. 
 
Despite a common presumption that a small group is usually the victim in an intergroup conflict, our result 
suggests that it need not be the case. It turns out that, in our framework, a small group has strong incentives to 
engage in outward-looking identity strengthening, such as stereotyping or airing grievances against a specific, large 
out-group, while a large group has strong incentives to engage in inward-looking identity strengthening, such as 
self-stereotyping and glorifying its own history. It suggests that when a large group seems to be bullying a small 
group, it may in fact only be a small segment of the former that is doing so. Glaeser (2005) models a small segment 
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of the agents, called political entrepreneurs, in the majority who spread hatred against a minority. 
 
More generally, our analysis suggests that there is generally a difference between when well-defined outgroups 
exist and when they do not and clarifies the conditions under which knowledge of well-defined outgroups really 
matters. Having a well-defined outgroup is useful for a small ingroup because it allows the ingroup to have a target 
for stereotyping. On the other hand, such a well-defined outgroup is not necessarily for a large ingroup because the 
ingroup will find it more beneficial to engage in self-stereotyping. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented a framework of intergroup relationship in which agents are concerned about both 
material payoffs and psychological payoffs. The framework has the following feature. On the one hand, agents want 
to work with outgroup agents to increase their material payoffs. On the other hand, they are unwilling to do so 
unless they are sufficiently compensated for their losses. Hence, we are able to determine each group‟s welfare as a 
function of its own group identity, as well as the group identities of other groups. This thus allows us to study the 
incentive for a group to shape its own psychological preferences. 
 
We have compared two strategies ---- one that increases the group‟s amicability among members (self-
stereotyping) and the other that decreases its amicability towards some judiciously chosen out-group (stereotyping). 
Self-stereotyping does not require specific knowledge about outgroup members, while stereotyping requires such 
knowledge of a specific outgroup. We find that a large group benefits more from self-stereotyping and a small group 
more from stereotyping. Therefore, having a well-defined outgroup is useful for a small ingroup because it allows 
the ingroup to have a target for stereotyping; on the other hand, such a well-defined outgroup is not necessarily for a 
large ingroup because the ingroup will find it more beneficial to engage in self-stereotyping. 
 
In our analysis, we have ignored the costs of changing a group‟s identity. Implicitly we assumed that the cost of 
strengthening intragroup amicability by one unit is just the same as the cost of decreasing intergroup amicability 
toward a targeted outgroup by one unit. Because of this, we could simply compare the effects of self-stereotyping 
and stereotyping without examining the costs. In realty, the aforementioned implicit assumption on costs does not 
hold in general. For instance, an ingroup may differ from outgroup 1 with a rigid boundary and from outgroup 2 
with a fluid, superficial boundary. In this case, stereotyping against outgroup 1 may be easier, less costly, than 
stereotyping against outgroup 2. We leave these issues for future studies. 
 
In the last two decades, economics has been learning a lot from psychology. In this paper, we have shown that, 
by using formal modeling that is familiar in economics but not in psychology, we can shed light on issues that 
interest psychologists. This is also part of the reason encouraging us to write this paper. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2 
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which is just the LHS. 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1 
Before showing Proposition 1, we first show two useful immediate results. Note that 
 
 
   
   
 
.0
!
!1!
!
!1!
)(
!
!1!
2
:
:
:












































iT
i
TiT
iiTiT
iiiiTiTii
i
ss
s
n
TnT
a
iTu
n
TnT
a
Tu
a
iTu
n
TnT
a

 
 
Since Nsa iiii //
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Next, note that 
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For result 2, by definition (from (6)), 
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Therefore, a sufficient condition for iiiiji aa  //   is to let 
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For result 4, we can derive directly from (6) and (5) the expression of iji a /  and iii a /  in the three-
group case as follows: 
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Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for iiiiji aa  //   can be obtained as: 
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the upper bound of which is fulfilled by construction. This concludes the proof. 
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